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We Need High-Speed Vessels Again
By Captain Jeff Kline, U.S. Navy
Picture a slightly different lime. A high-speed vessel, HSV-23. loiters just
north of the Yucatan Channel. The 25-mun
crew has been patrolling the northern
Caribbean. Their missions: provide visual
confinnation of shipping heading toward
southeastern U.S. ports and visible de-
terrence for homeland security, and be on
call for emergencies.
Suddenly, HSV·23 receives intelligence
on a South American vessel suspected of
carrying a dangerous chemical compound.
(Prior to the patrol. the crew was aug-
mented by a special boarding team in case
of such a possibility.) The combat infor-
mation center plots the last known posi-
tion of the SUSpeCI vessel and directs the
assigned intelligence, surveillance. and re-
connaissance (lSR) platform to conduct
an open-occan search. The target is 600
nautical miles (nm) to the soulh. heading
northeast at 20 knols. The intercept plot
is calculated to be ten hours. Orders from
the bridge start the gas-turbine engines
that tum the large water-jet propulsors and
the intercept is under way.
The II September terrorist attack has
promoted a reappraisal of the Navy's ca-
pabilities, functions. force structure, and
missions. 1 In addition to the familiar roles
of power projection and overseas pres-
ence. an old, basic mission has returned-
close-in defense of the U.S. homeland.
The Navy's role in supporting the Coast
Guard and assisting civilian agencies in
defense of the nation's coasts and ports
can be fulfilled with its current forces.
Battle groups, teamed with shore-based
maritime patrol aircraft using national in-
telligence and organic sensors. can find,
inlercept. board. and-if ncce~sary-<h.'­
tain a vC!lscl on the high seas that nw) bL'
attempting 10 infiltrate our l.:oa~I~. Navul
forces have years of experience in mar-
itimc interdiclion and counterdrug oper-
ations. But major fleet commitmcllI .. In
the war on terrorism overseas mean that
there are insufficienl ships to conduct IJ(llh
missions for an eXlended period.
If Ihe Navy is to maintain an effective
role in maritime homeland security. sev-
eral options are available for providing
necessary platforms. In the shan (eml. thc
only feasible option is (a increase the
readiness of the ships and aircraft in the
interdeploymem training cycle to provide
"ready destroyers" and "ready aircraft .. to
meet search, intercept, and e~cort re-
quirements. A longer-lerm-and l1lor~
expensive--option is 10 increase produc-
The "slightly different time" wa<; the early
1990s, the HSV was the USS Acquiia
(PHM-4), and the dangerous chemicals
were drugs. The special boarding team
was a Coast Guard law-enforcement
detachment and the [SR platform was a
Navy P-3 Orion. The intercept was made
successfully.
As a former hydrofoil sailor, I can at-
test to the engineering problems posed
by the PHMs, which have been removed
from the inventory. Nonetheless, they
were solid contributors to a sound
counterdrug concept of operations. The
Navy would profit from its experiences
in the operational as well as the design
realm.
The Navy can meet its homeland de-
fense goals quickly and inexpensively by
developing a high-speed vessel that will
provide better coverage in fewer numbers
than fast patrol boats and destroyers.
Combined with an increase in UAV pro-
duction and establishment of coastal com-
mand-and-control nodes, it is a most
promising concept.
'Chief of N:)Val Operalions Adm. Vernon Clark. USN.
"Setting Our Course in lhe Terror War:' (remarks al
lhe Naval War College). 29 Oclober 2001.
Captain Kline last ~erved as deputy operations ofl'i-
ccr on the Sixlh Fleet ~tllff. He now holds lhe opcr-





Agure 1: Cone of Intercept for One Hour
NOTS RELATIVE
R ABOUT 30 NM
TARGET
(although many threats may be faster) and
a desired intercept time of no longer than
one hour. The maximum relative speed a
30-knot interceptor can obtain on a ves-
sel going 20 knots is when the two are
steaming directly at each other. The worst
case for the 3D-knot intcrceptor is to be
in a tail chase 10 nm astern of the target.
A "cone of intercept" can be created to
visualize where a threat vessel can be rel-
ative to the 30-knot interceptor and still
be within intercept range-see Figure I.
The cone of intercept in this example
is a circle with a radius of 30 nm and an
area of 2,830 square miles. Thus, for a
3D-knot interceptor, the maximum one-
hour coverage that can be provided is
2.830 square miles against a 20-knot sus-
pect vessel. The same cone of intercept
for a 50-knot interceptor will produce cov-
erage of 7,850 square miles or a 2.8 ratio
advantage. The advantage is constant re-
gardless of how many hours we extend
the desired intercept time. It means that
one high-speed vessel can provide the ca-
pability of almost three 3D-knot intercep-
tors if we increase its speed by 60%. In
addition to intercepts, patJol and emer-
gency-response tasks are bener fulfilled
with HSVs. Again, because of their higher
speed, fewer vessels are needed to meet
mission requirements.
This is not a huge conceptual leap in
the employment of naval forces. The sce-
nario at the beginning of this note is true.
SPEED OF TARGETS: 20 KNOTS
(ALL HEADING SOUTH)
tion of the Ar/eig" Burke
(DDG-51 )-class guided-mis-
sile destroyers and acceler-
ale delivery of a new mar-
itime patrol aircraft. Finally,
the Navy could develop a
high-speed vessel for the 'ju-
nior side" of its mix of com-
batants that could-if prop-
erly linked with intelligence
and surveillance agencies--:
fulfill the homeland security
mission effectively and eco-
nomically. This relatively in-
expensive option would ac-
complish the mission and
free blue-water forces for the
war overseas.
It is useful to revisit the
concept of creating a force
of small, fast, inexpensive
combatants as interceptors to
conduct sea-denial opera-
tions near coasts. There is a
parallel between the Navy's
littoral warfare doctrine and
maritime homeland security.
Creation of command nodes-such as
those of the Joint Interagency Task
Force-tied 10 the national intelligence
network and using operational sensors
such as Global Hawk, could direct high-
speed Navy combatants and Coast Guard
cuttcrs to suspect vessels. The intelligence
network as well as the fast interceptors
could be manned by active and reserve
personnel.
Why a high-speed vessel (HSV)? First,
because we need many of them soon. The
HSV is a developed design requiring only
slight modification that should allow us
to lay keels within six months of contract.
Its design would profit from our previous
HSV experience with the Navy's guided-
missile hydrofoils (PHMs) and other craft.
A candidate would be about I ,()(x) tons,
with an efficient mode of propulsion for
sustained loitering, yet the capability to
obtain speeds of 50 knots. h would ac-
commodate unmanned aerial vehicles and
small helicopters. carry two to four rigid-
hulled inflatable boats, and be armed
heavily enough to pose a serious threat to
merchant ships or armed boats. It would
be described best as a hybrid of a corvette,
small cutter. and patrol craft.
An efficicnt interceptor must be capa-
ble of high speed to increase its ability to
cover large amounts of ocean. To illus-
trate. I consider a 30-knot interceptor ver-
sus a 50-knot interceptor. Assume a sus-
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